Train Accident in the UK for Risk Management -myassignmenthelp

Question: Discuss about theTrain Accident in the UK for Risk Management Systems. Answer: Hazards and risks are part and parcel of everyday living both at the workplace and in the private space. Hazards can be defined as conditions that have the potential to cause illness, injury and deaths. It can also end up with damage of goods and equipment and disrupt operations. Risk can broadly be defined as the probability that hazard will occur and cause injury. Workplaces are replete with hazards which are attendant with operations of production. Risk and safety management can therefore refer to the sets of processes that are used in formulating and implementing actions to mitigate hazards that are identified. The safety and risk management are dependent on the state legislation and policies that govern the Occupational Health and Safety Plan of each country. The risk and safety policies on train accidents in the UK works under directives set by the EU and transposed into law in the UK. Background on Train Risk and Safety Management in UK The European Union (EU) policy framework on occupational safety and health (2014-2020) provides the basic framework which has been legislated into law in the UK (EUR-Lex, 2017). The policy defines rules and structures on occupational risks, prevention and safer work environment promotion. The EU further sets out specific regulations that govern the risk and safety management of train operations amongst all member states. Regulation 2016/796 of the European Agency for Railways (ERA) states that guaranteeing high levels of railway transport are part of its core mandate (Biennial Report, 2016, p.1). The agency works with Member states and industry stakeholders in monitoring performance in safety in a multidimensional approach to safety (Kozuch, Sienkiewicz-Malyjurek, 2017). Data collected is shared with the National Safety Authorities and investigative bodies of each member state. In the UK the office of Rail and Road is tasked with giving oversight to the railway sector. Health and safety issues are comprehensively addressed by this office (ORR, 2017). Passenger safety information such as gaps on platforms and stepping distances are provided. Statistics and data are also available on signals, rolling stock, level crossings, train protection and crime. Under the 1974 Health and Safety at Work, investigative and enforcement authority was conferred to this office (ORR, 2017).This aims to ensure that safety is undertaken as a multi-disciplinary approach (Crutchfield Roughton, 2013, p. 3).Occupational health guidance and advice to railway stakeholders is also given. Strategy and guidance on railway operations are also set out by this office. This agency is also tasked with giving annual reports on safety and health performance on Britains Railway. Train Accident- Grimston Lane footpath crossing February 2016 The information on the train accident was retrieved from a report given by the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB). A pedestrian was struck and killed by a train while crossing the Lane footpath level crossing in Suffolk (Trimley). The accident happened on Tuesday at 12:19 hours and involved a train traveling from Ipswich whose destination was Felixstowe. According to the report, the pedestrian acknowledged hearing the train horn signal by raising his arm. The accident was caused probably by misjudging the time he needed to cross before the train reached him. He could also have misjudged the time that the train would take to reach him (Romanowska, Jamroz, Kustra, 2017).Another assumption that was posited is that he may not have been able to clearly see the train before deciding to cross. He could also not be aware of the train because of the misalignment of the crossing. The victim was 82 year old Stanley Sawyer and is classified as vulnerable users by the Network Rails guidelines (RAIB, 2016, p.14). The victim had was under medication for dementia which had been diagnosed earlier. The crossing which the deceased use was skewed and did not cross the railway line at an angle of 90 degrees. This increased marginally the length of the path across the railway and may have contributed to this fatality. It would have necessitated the pedestrian to look over their shoulder before making the crossing. This particular crossing may be more difficult for persons who are elderly to use. Mr. Sawyer was known to have regularly crossed the railway in the past while using a walking stick (RAIB, 2016, p.14). This was due to a problem with his left leg which required the use of a walking aid. On this particular day, he was not use it and this could have contributed to the accident. Safety Breaches The UK is known to have one of the safest records in usage of trains in Europe (Data Blog, 2016). The main safety breach can be attributed to the failure Network Rail not to make allowance for vulnerable users who regularly make level crossings. Network Rail owns the railway infrastructure in this particular area of operation. Vulnerable users have been shown to account for more than 60% of fatalities witnessed in similar level crossings. These vulnerable users require more time than the standard allowance provided by Network Rail. The current allowance for traverse speed is 0.75 m/s while the victim was crossing the railway at 05 m/s (RAIB, 2016, p.29).The skew of the railway crossing also contributed to the fatality as it did not avail to him the best position to view the incoming train. This may have contributed to the miscalculation he may have made in the time needed to traverse the crossing. Level crossing accident account for 26% of all train accidents in the EU (Biennial Report, 2016, p.31). Passive level crossings account for 47% of all level crossings in the EU (Biennial Report, 2016, p.54). This particular crossing in the UK falls under this category which significantly contributes to accidents. The lack of active level crossing (LC) mechanisms such as automatic user warning and protection could have contributed to the fatality of Mr. Sawyer. Additional measures such as an active LC with rail-side protection could have significantly reduced the probability of the accident resulting in a fatality (Yan, Gao, Tang Zhou, 2017). Network Rail failed on two levels of level crossing management: level crossing management and asset inspection. The risk assessment consists of collecting data on level crossings with regards to the use, condition and environment. This is then followed by making recommendations after analyzing the data and improvements can then be made. The asset inspection involves regular inspections which identify defects and appropriate rectification is undertaken ( Hopkins, 2014) The last risk assessment and asset inspection undertaken in 2015 availed a number of control options that would have significantly eradicated the risk and improved safety at the crossing (RAIB, 2016, p. 19). None of the following options was implemented: installation of miniature standard stop lights or overlay stop lights and replacing the skewed timber deck with rubber decking which was straight. These breaches in risk assessment and safety management by Network Rail contributed to the fatal accident at Grimston level crossing. The above recommendations were instead seen as long-term options for the future. Recommendations, Policy change and Implementation. RAIB made several recommendations following the investigation into the accident that occurred at Grimston. The train and infrastructure owner and operator were tasked with identifying the effects of the skewed level crossing on behavior of the users (RAIB, 2016, p.36). The effects should be identified in relation to the passivity of the crossing and include the sightings by users of the approaching train. The operator should also undertake a review of its internal processes on level crossing risk management (Hopkins, 2014). This should incorporate all risks management on level crossings and the effect of the skewed alignment. Recommendations should be made operational with level crossing managers who should be given the new appropriate training. Network Rail developed a new long-term policy framework titled Transforming Level Crossings. The operator proposes to highlight the decking across the railway with markings which show the crossings as danger zones by 2025 (RAIB, 2016, p.35). This will help pedestrians to make the decision to cross after sufficiently assessing that it is safe to do so. The second policy action that was planned is to automate the level crossing systems by the year 2039. This will transform the current passive crossings to become active in status (Hongwen Yuguang, 2014). Network Rail also advised RAIB that it would allow some allowance for vulnerable users based on professional judgment. Bantry Montgomery (2016) state that this would factor in the aging population some of whom suffered from dementia related conditions. Following a report authored by ORR on the level crossing, Network Rail undertook some measures to remedy the problem. This was based on hazard identification, control and monitoring of outcomes undertaken (Khan, Rathnayaka Ahmed, 2015, p.124) Vegetation which was redundant and obscured sighting of the approaching train was removed (RAIB, 2016, p.34).The same applied to structures which also contributed to reducing visibility of the incoming train at Thorpe Lane. This helped in improving the visibility of the trains using the Grimston level crossing. Paths that approach the level crossing have also been fenced. The skewed timber deck across the deck was also replaced with rubber decking. The alignment was changed to make the crossing to be perpendicular to the track. This eliminated the skewed alignment and shortened the crossing time. Hazards and risks are a common occurrence in most workplaces. Mitigating the hazards calls for plan which incorporates risk and safety features. The risk and safety management within the UK on train operations is based on European standards. The policy framework postulated is transposed into national laws and regulations. The train accident which occurred at Grimston was the result of breaches in safety and risk management. The investigation that followed identified gaps in the risk assessment and asset management process. Recommendations that were made and implemented helped in eliminating the hazard that was identified. The new policy framework adopted projects to eliminate more potential risks in the future in the risk and safety management plan. References Bantry, W, E., Montgomery, P. (2016). Supporting people with dementia to walkabout safely outdoors: development of a structured model of assessment. Health Social Care In The Community, 24(4), 473-484. doi:10.1111/hsc.12226 Biennial Report. (2016). Railway Safety Performance in the European Union. European Union Agency for Railway Safety. Retrieved from https://erail.era.europa.eu/documents/SPR.pdf Crutchfield, N., Roughton, J. E. (2013). Safety Culture : An Innovative Leadership Approach. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. Data Blog. (2016). How Safe are Europes railways? The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/jul/25/how-safe-are-europe-railways EUR-Lex. (2017). Access to European Union Law. Europa.EU. Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html Hongwen, G., Yuguang, W. (2014). Study on the Safety Management System of High-Speed Railway. Applied Mechanics Materials, 744-7461838. doiKo?uch, B., Sienkiewicz-Ma?yjurek, K. (2017). Multidimensionality of Risk in Public Safety Management Processes. Risk Management In Public Administration, 115. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-30877-7_5:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.744-746.1838 Hopkins, A.(2014). Safety culture and Risk. Wolters Kluwer. Khan, F., Rathnayaka, S., Ahmed, S. (2015). Methods and models in process safety and risk management: Past, present and future. Process Safety Environmental Protection: Transactions of the Institution of Chemical Engineers Part B, 98(Part B), 116-147. doi:10.1016/j.psep.2015.07.005 ORR. (2017). Health and Safety. Gov.UK. Retrieved from https://orr.gov.uk/rail/health-and-safety RAIB. (2016). Accident Report. Gov.UK. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/570741/R232016_161121_Grimston_Lane.pdf Romanowska, A., Jamroz, K., Kustra, W. (2017). Pedestrian safety management using the risk-based approach. MATEC Web of Conferences, 1401. doi:10.1051/matecconf/201712201007 Yan, F., Gao, C., Tang, T., Zhou, Y. (2017). A Safety Management and Signaling System Integration Method for Communication-Based Train Control System. Urban Rail Transit, 3(2), 90. doi: 10.1007/s40864-017-0051-7